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Abstract: We examine the question of deposit insurance through the lens of risk management by
addressing three key issues: 1) how big should the fund be; 2) how should coverage be priced; and 3)
who pays in the event of loss.  We propose a risk-based premium system that is explicitly based on the
loss distribution faced by the FDIC.  The loss distribution can be used to determine the appropriate
level of fund adequacy and reserving in terms of a stated confidence interval and to identify risk-based
pricing options.  We explicitly estimate that distribution using two different approaches and find that
reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution corresponding to about a BBB+
rating.  We then identify three risk-sharing alternatives addressing who is responsible for funding
losses in different parts of the loss distribution.  We show in an example that expected loss based
pricing, while appropriately penalizing riskier banks, also penalizes smaller banks.  By contrast,
unexpected loss contribution based pricing significantly penalizes very large banks because large
exposures contribute disproportionately to overall (FDIC) portfolio risk.
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1.  Introduction
At the end of 2000, the FDIC Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) had 8571 institutions as members
comprising $6.5tn in assets and about $2.5tn in insured deposits.  The fund had a balance of
$31bn to cover this exposure.
3  Was that enough?  What does “enough” mean?
Motivated by similar questions and concerns, the FDIC issued an options paper on regulatory
reform in August, 2000, that discussed weaknesses in the present deposit insurance system and
offered possible solutions.
4  Whatever the merits or faults of deposit insurance are (and we will
discuss these briefly below), any reform needs to address three key issues: 1) how big should the
fund be; 2) how should coverage be priced; and 3) who pays in the event of loss.  We take a novel
approach and argue that the answer to those questions can be found in some of the same risk
management techniques used by banks to manage their (mostly asset) risk.  After all, the FDIC is
managing a portfolio of credit assets, consisting of contingent exposures to the banks it insures.
Therefore the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is directly related to the riskiness of
the individual banks in its portfolio.
This problem can be broken down into the familiar components of contemporary credit analysis:
the probability of an insured bank defaulting (PD), the severity (or loss given default – LGD) of
pay-out in the event of a claim, the size of the claim in the event of default (exposure), and the
likelihood that several of these adverse events will occur at the same time (default or loss
correlation).  These factors can be used to estimate the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC
insured banks and – critically for policy questions such as pricing of deposit premiums – to frame
                                                     
3 The FDIC has two funds: the BIF and the smaller Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) which at
that time had a balance of $10.9 bn to cover about $750 bn of insured deposits.
4 http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/OptionPaper.html.  See also the commentary on the
options paper by Blinder and Wescott (2001).-2-
a discussion about who “owns” which parts of that distribution.  We explicitly estimate that
distribution for the U.S. banking system using two variations of an options-based approach à la
Merton (1974) and include plausible stress scenarios to provide further insight into tail behavior.
In the first application of options theory to deposit insurance pricing, Merton (1977) points out
that deposit insurance is much like a loan guarantee and should be priced accordingly.  Using
Merton’s approach, Marcus and Shaked (1984) found that the deposit insurance pricing schedule
in effect at that time was far too flat (high risk banks paid similar rates as low risk banks -- still
true today), and that the FDIC significantly overpriced deposit insurance.
5  In a theoretical paper,
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) argue the other way, namely that the FDIC intentionally sets
premiums too low to induce banks to purchase insurance and submit themselves to FDIC
regulatory restrictions.  Pennacchi (1987), in an attempt to settle the debate of under vs.
overpricing, questions the degree of regulatory control and impact the FDIC really has.  By
allowing for a range of control, Pennacchi computes pricing bounds, and the actual premiums the
FDIC charged at the time were contained within those bounds.  Interestingly, under the
assumption of low effective regulatory control, the estimates indicate under-pricing of premiums,
a prescient result given that his study used data from 1978 – 1983, before the worst of the S&L
crisis.
In a recent paper, Pennacchi (2002) develops a risk-based insurance premium pricing model using
an insurance valuation approach.  His methodology involves treating the insurance guarantee as a
moving average of a series of long term insurance contracts.  The pricing scheme is stable (i.e.
address the procyclicality problem of the existing regime) yet subject to frequent updating.  While
                                                     
5 See also Ronn and Verma (1986) for a similar analysis.-3-
Pennacchi provides fair insurance rate estimates for only 42 banks and finds, as do we, that the
distribution of those rates is quite skewed.
We find that the BIF reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution of the
8571 banks which make up the BIF, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating.  This finding is
robust across different approaches (asset vs. equity based) and assumptions about loss severity
(fixed vs. stochastic).  The BBB+ rating is actually quite low – lower, in fact, than most of the
large rated institutions covered by the fund, and just slightly above implied average rating for all
banks in the system.  The implication is that the U.S. government backstop must be quite
important in maintaining the confidence that depositors ascribe to the fund.  Capital levels
commensurate with a AAA rating and / or under stress scenarios, by contrast, are multiples (3 –
10) of current levels.  Of course the fund cannot have a better credit rating than that of any single
exposure that could render the fund insolvent. Of the five institutions that have an effective
exposure (severity ×  exposure) in excess of fund reserves, the lowest has a rating of A-.  Of the
eight institutions which have total insured deposits in excess of the fund reserves, the lowest rated
institution has a rating of BBB.
The potential for “catastrophic” losses resulting from a large number of bank failures (or from the
failure of large banks) suggests that the FDIC’s loss distribution should be thought of as
partitioned into two zones: small losses that are covered by reserves (either funded or callable);
and excess losses that are covered by reinsurance.  A key question under this structure is who
should bear the risk of each part of the FDIC’s loss distribution?
6  Possible candidates include the
government, the banks themselves through a mutual insurance system, and the private capital
markets through risk transfer or reinsurance.  Each of these alternatives has significant-4-
consequences for pricing and policy options.  We argue that the most practical and lowest cost
solution is the for government to own both zones, a system which can be viewed as a mandatory
insurance contract between the government and the banks.
Finally, how can pricing reflect the discrete risk contribution of individual banks to the FDIC?
Pricing should be risk-based and, we argue, based specifically on expected losses.  This greatly
mitigates banks’ moral hazard, introduced by the very existence of deposit insurance, and it
ensures that the fund is self-financing over time.  We show in an example that expected loss
based pricing, while appropriately penalizing riskier (higher probability of default) banks also
penalizes smaller banks.  By contrast, unexpected loss contribution based pricing significantly
penalizes very large banks because large exposures contribute disproportionately to overall
(FDIC) portfolio risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides some background on the theoretical
justifications for deposit insurance and a quick  history lesson on the U.S. experience; Section 3
describes the economic approach to measuring individual bank and portfolio risk; Section 4
shows empirical results from the estimation of the FDIC’s cumulative loss distribution; Section 5
discusses policy options derived from the distribution, including the pricing of premiums; and
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Questions of fund adequacy and risk sharing are complicated by concentration problems arising from the
FDIC’s exposure to large banks.-5-
2.  Deposit Insurance: Theory and Practice
2.1. The Promise of Deposit Insurance
Why might we want deposit insurance?  The answer typically given is to prevent bank runs and
thereby enhance the stability of the financial system; more formally it is to overcome the
asymmetry of information in the banking system (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994)).  The bank knows more about the riskiness of its activities than do its depositors.
A depositor, therefore, is unable to tell a good bank from a bad one.  Because banks are highly
leveraged institutions, depositors have a strong incentive to show up at the bank first to withdraw
their funds in case they doubt the financial health of a particular bank.  Those at the end of the
line may get nothing.  In short, deposit insurance is designed to prevent depositors from
overreacting to bad news about banks.
7
The creation of such a safety net comes at a cost, namely moral hazard.  Depositors no longer
have an incentive to monitor (or pay to monitor) banks since their deposits are guaranteed up to
the coverage limit (currently $100,000 per individual per institution in the U.S.).  Banks have an
attendant incentive to increase risk.  Hence the name of the game in designing a safety net has
been to balance the need to prevent bank panics (and other social costs to bank failure such as
credit crunches) with the moral hazard brought on by the very presence of the safety net.  The
regulation of bank capital is often justified to achieve this balance.
8
                                                     
7 Bank runs and panics were quite real and prevalent in the US in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  In the
years preceding the creation of the FDIC (i.e. 1930-33), the number of bank failures averaged 2000 per
year (Mishkin (1997)).
8 Santos (2001), in a survey of the bank capital regulation, points out the necessity of jointly considering
the problems of deposit insurance pricing, lender of last resort and bank capital standards and regulation.
“In general, the optimal regulation encompasses a menu of regulatory instruments, designed to extract
information from banks and minimize the cost of ‘bribing’ the lower quality banks to mimic the higher
quality ones.” (Santos (2001) p. 59).  In short, while the information asymmetry inherent in banking is a
real issue, deposit insurance may not be the only solution, and if deposit insurance is chosen, its design
matters in determining banking stability and efficiency.-6-
Since monitoring difficulty is cited as a primary motivation of bank regulation and deposit
insurance, are market mechanisms really unable to perform this task?  Berger, Herring and Szegö
(1995) and Calomiris (1999), among others, argue that subordinated debt can play a very useful
role in market discipline.
9  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and De Young, Flannery, Lang and
Sorescu (2001) find that subordinated debt yields indeed incorporate information about the bank.
However, Hancock and Kwast (2001) point to some pitfalls (low liquidity) of using this financial
instrument to evaluate the conditions of banks.  Swidler and Wilcox (2002) take a different tack;
they find that implied volatilities of bank stocks are informative about bank risk.  Finally, Morgan
(2000) reminds us that monitoring the riskiness of banks is not so easy by showing that bond
raters disagree more about banks and insurance companies than about any other kind of firm.
Moreover, recent research on corporate bonds indicates that credit (default) risk plays a
surprisingly small role in the determination of credit spreads (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann
(2001) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, (2001)), casting further doubt on the
feasibility of bank subordinated debt schemes.
The evidence on the efficacy of deposit insurance in promoting stability is mixed at best.  In an
important paper, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), using data on regulatory and supervisory
policies in 107 countries, show that generous deposit insurance schemes have strong adverse
effects on bank stability.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), in a study on multi-country
comparison on market discipline and financial safety net design, find that explicit deposit
insurance decreases market discipline while private or joint (with government) management of
deposit insurance funds increases market discipline.-7-
2.2. A Quick History Lesson of Deposit Insurance in the U.S.
10
Following an alarming level of bank failures in the 1980s, the FDIC’s Bank Insurance Fund (BIF)
became depleted to the point where it had negative net worth in 1991.  In response to the banking
(and savings and loan) crisis, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) that year.
FDICIA re-capitalized the BIF with a loan from the Treasury and allowed the FDIC to raise the
deposit insurance rates paid by banks to an average of 23 bp.
11  By 1995, the fund reached a target
level of reserves set under FDICIA of 1.25% of insured deposits
 12 known as the Designated
Reserve Ratio (DRR).
13
Aside from recapitalizing an otherwise bankrupt fund, FDICIA also allowed the FDIC to
introduce risk-based pricing for deposit insurance (Mishkin (1997)).  Subsequent legislation,
however, tied the level of pricing to the adequacy of reserves in the fund,
 14 so that the vast bulk
of banks do not pay any premiums when the fund exceeds the DRR.  As of year-end 1999, pricing
for 93% of FDIC-insured institutions, accounting for 97% of deposits, was in fact zero (FDIC
(2000)).  The pricing on the remaining 3% of deposits was differentiated for risk somewhat, with
five non-zero pricing buckets ranging from 3 bp to 27 bp.
15  But in practical terms there is little
meaningful risk differentiation.  The roughly 8,000 insured banks falling within the zero premium
class surely span enormous differences in risk profile, and in size as well.  Yet under the current
                                                                                                                                                             
9 To be sure, Calomiris (1998) is a severe skeptic of deposit insurance; he views FDIC insurance to be “the
single most destabilizing influence in the financial system”, a view we do not share.
10 For a more detailed account, see Mishkin (1997) and Benston and Kaufman (1998).
11 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) had allowed an
increase in rates from 8.33 bps to 15 bps.
12 At the end of 2000, the DRR was 1.35%.
13 In addition to the fund balance, the FDIC has access to a $30 bn line of credit from the Treasury for
which it pays nothing (Wilcox (2000)).
14 Pennacchi (2000) demonstrates in a simulation exercise how the setting of deposit insurance premiums to
target a particular insurance fund level leads to distortions in banks’ cost of deposit financing.
15 The premiums are tied to CAMEL ratings.  This government risk-based pricing schedule is half as steep
(9:1) as the market’s as viewed by credit spreads (18:1).  For instance, the credit spread ratio of CCC to AA
corporate bonds in April, 2002, was 735:40 bp or about 18:1 (1-year maturity).  In our sample there is one
CCC+ rated bank and several BB+ banks.-8-
structure, a bank with over $100 billion in insured deposits and very complex risk profile may be
charged the same amount (zero!) as a small community bank.
The statutory link between the DRR and premiums also introduces cyclicality in pricing.  The
DRR will drop only at times when the banking industry is weak, requiring then-weakened banks
to cough up more in terms of deposit insurance premiums precisely at a time when they can least
afford to do so.
16
Blinder and Wescott (2001), in their comments on the FDIC policy options paper (FDIC (2000)),
list three main concerns with the state of deposit insurance in the U.S. today: absence of real risk-
based pricing, potential procyclical bias, and determining a fair coverage limit.  In this paper we
explicitly address the first two, but not the third.
3.  The Economic Approach to Measuring Risk in a Credit Portfolio
Our starting point for answering the three key questions (how safe should the fund be? how to
price premiums? who pays in the event of loss?) is to construct an explicit model of the FDIC’s
loss distribution.  The loss distribution can then be used to determine the appropriate level of fund
adequacy and reserving in terms of a stated confidence interval and to identify risk-based pricing
options.  In fact, efforts to set capital in relation to an explicit model of a financial institution’s
risk profile lie at the core of the current proposals for reform of the BIS capital rules (see the BIS
(2001), and Jones and Mingo (1998)).  Our approach applies the same types of methodologies
                                                     
16 Under FDICIA and the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996, pricing would jump (in stages) to as much
as 23 bp for banks currently paying zero premiums in the event the DRR falls below 1.25%.  This could
reduce pre-tax net income of insured institutions by almost $9 billion.  See FDIC (2000).-9-
that are under consideration by the BIS Models Task Force to the FDIC’s own loss distribution
for resolving similar questions of risk and capital management.
17
3.1. The FDIC is Like a Bank
The conceptual framework used to understand risk and capital for a bank which has a portfolio of
credit exposures can also be used to understand risk and capital for the FDIC.  The cumulative
loss distribution allows the potential for loss to be directly compared with the reserves and other
resources available to the insurance funds.
18  This analysis can also be reversed to determine what
level of resources – or reserve ratio – is required to reach a chosen solvency standard.  By
creating an explicit link between the potential for loss and reserves, the FDIC can consider the
appropriate level of fund adequacy in terms of both a stated confidence interval and market
equivalents.
19  For example, just as an individual bank chooses to capitalize according to a desired
credit rating, so too can the FDIC choose to capitalize the insurance funds to a desired rating.
This approach differs fundamentally from the current system, in which the desired reserve ratio
(DRR) is set as a fixed percentage independent of the fund’s actual loss profile.
                                                     
17 Our “bottom-up” approach also differs from the “top-down” approach of Sheehan (1998).  For a
robustness discussion of an earlier version of our approach, see Bennett (2001)
18 The first resource is the expected income from premiums and interest.  In most cases, this will be more
than sufficient to cover the losses and the fund will have a gain.  The next resource is the current balance of
the fund itself. If the losses in any period exceed the funds available, a backstop resource, such as a loan or
grant from the Treasury, is required to ensure the payment of all obligations.  In fact, by law the Treasury
extends a $30bn (repayable) line of credit to the FDIC; however, the FDIC, in stark contract to a private
sector institution, does not have to pay for this line of credit.  See also Wilcox (2000).
19 In our analytical discussion of the insurance fund, we will use terms such as capitalization, economic
capital and capital charge, despite the fact that the government may not hold capital as an insurer.  This is
discussed in more detail in Section 5.-10-
3.2. Modeling the Loss Distribution
The first step in analyzing the FDIC’s risk profile is to recognize that the deposit insurance funds
are portfolios of counterparty risks.  These portfolios consist of individual exposures to insured
banks and thrifts, each of which has a small but non-zero chance of causing a loss to the fund.
Such a portfolio is similar to a bank loan portfolio, although the nature the underlying risks in the
FDIC funds raises unique issues.  The FDIC portfolio effectively consists of the sum of the “tail”
risks of individual banks defaulting.
Expected loss (EL) is simply the (unconditional) mean of the loss distribution; its standard
deviation is often called unexpected loss (UL).  We will be interested in tail probabilities, say
99.9% (corresponding to roughly an A- rating), of this loss distribution, and the distance, either
from the origin or EL, to that critical point.  In fact, that distance will be the amount of reserves
(funded or callable) needed to insure solvency of the fund.  To the extent that there are
insufficient funds available to repay insured deposits, then the excess deposit losses will be borne
by the FDIC.  Put another way, the FDIC assumes the residual “tail” risk of loss to insured
deposits.
It is important to recognize that the solvency level will never be 100%.  To require 100%
solvency means to hold as much capital as insured deposits in the system.  Hence the acceptance
of a solvency level of less than 100% is tantamount to accepting that, past some level of loss, “all
bets are off,” even those with the U.S. government and its taxpayers.
20
                                                     
20 To be sure, solvency levels of funded reserves are not equal to the solvency level implied by the implicit
callable reserves of the banking system nor, going yet further out into the tail of the loss distribution, the
full faith and credit of the US government.  For this (and other) reasons it will be useful to partition the loss
distribution when considering policy alternatives, as we will in Section 5.-11-
FIGURE 1 shows the actual historical default frequency of commercial banks covered by the
FDIC insurance fund since 1934, with a stylized loss distribution on the right.  The chart
demonstrates that default frequency can fluctuate widely over time.  In 1981, only 0.069% of the
insured institutions failed, while just six years later, 1.33% of the institutions failed.  The average
annual default rate from 1934 to 2000 was 0.26% and its standard deviation is 0.42%.
The derivation of the loss distribution is discussed in detail elsewhere (see Saunders and Allen
(2002) and references therein).  Hence our exposition will be brief.  First we will describe risk at
the bank level, then risk at the (FDIC) portfolio level and finally the simulation procedure for
building up the loss distribution.
3.2.1. Risk at the Bank Level
Let PDi = probability of default for bank i over a one-year horizon.
21  Then the expected loss for
bank i will the product of PD, exposure (Xi) in the form of insured deposits
22 and the proportion
of Xi that will actually be lost, often called severity, Si:
ii i i EL=P D X S ⋅⋅ 3-1
Note that the recovery amount (one minus severity) is typically not known at time of exposure.
Hence in addition to PD being stochastic, severity is often treated as random.
Because default is a Bernoulli random variable, its standard deviation is  () 1 ii PDP D − , and if
we make the standard assumption of no correlation between PDi, Si  and X i, we obtain the
following formulation for unexpected loss, ULi
                                                     
21 The one-year horizon is not required but is typical.  Note also that sometimes the term “expected default
frequency,” or EDF, is used instead of PD.
22 The FDIC uses assets as an exposure proxy, as will we.  This is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.2.-12-
()
22 2 2 2
ii ii i S i i i S UL PD PD X PD X µ σ =− + 3-2
where Si ~ f(µ S, σ S) and is often taken to be a draw from a beta distribution.  The formulation
further simplifies when severity is a constant (i.e. 
i S σ  = 0):
()
22 2
i ii i S i UL PD PD X µ =−
The FDIC’s exposure to individual banks can be added together to create a cumulative loss
distribution.  Just as with a bank’s credit loss distribution, the FDIC’s cumulative loss distribution
will reflect the expected loss of the individual insured banks, the size of individual exposures, and
the correlation of losses in the portfolio.  Typically the distribution will be heavily skewed.  There
will likely be some “lumpiness” in the distribution which reflects the contribution of individual
large banks, each of which imposes a discrete, non-zero probability of a sizeable loss to the fund.
3.2.2. Risk at the Portfolio Level
Because expected loss is unaffected by correlation, portfolio EL is a summation of N individual
institution EL’s, just as the expected return on an equity portfolio is a simple weighted average of








This is especially useful when we consider expected loss pricing.  By charging individual
institutions expected loss pricing, the additivity of the individual EL’s implies that the FDIC is
charging for its overall expected loss.
Calculating portfolio unexpected loss must consider the correlation between individual losses, ρ ij.
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Portfolio UL may also be written as the sum of contributory unexpected losses, ULCi, from each

















The risk to FDIC’s portfolio of the i
th bank does not depend on its expected loss – after all, we
expect it and hence should account (price) for it.  Instead portfolio risk depends on the
contribution of the i
th bank to portfolio volatility, or contributory unexpected loss ULCi, which is
driven by two things: the volatility of bank i’s losses, which in turn is driven by its PD and
exposure (i.e. size), and its correlation with the rest of the portfolio.  What impact this may have
on insurance premiums under strict contributory risk-based pricing will be discussed in Section
5.1.
3.2.3. Building up the Loss Distribution
The loss distribution is really a characterization of the loss experience over the very long run, or
in all states of the world.  We need a way to link default (and loss) to changes in states of the
world.  Consider, therefore, the probability of default, PDi, as determined by a function of
systematic or macro variables M, shared by all banks, and a bank-specific idiosyncratic stochastic
component ε i
() ii PD f ε = M,,, , 3-4
Thus default correlation enters via M, but of course not all elements of M affect all banks in the
same way.  All credit portfolio models share this linkage of systematic risk factors, e.g. the
economy, to default and loss.  They differ in specifically how they are linked.-14-
Broadly there are three approaches.  The first is an options-based approach, often called the
Merton approach after Merton (1974), which we will follow in this paper.  This approach is used
by industry models such as by CreditMetrics as well as KMV’s PortfolioManager.  The second is
an econometric approach where PDi is estimated via logit with macro-variables entering the
regression directly (Wilson (1997)).  The third is an actuarial approach employed by CSFB’s
CreditRisk+ where the key risk driver is the variable mean default rate in the economy.  For
detailed comparisons, see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Saunders and Allen (2002) and Gordy
(2000).
3.2.4. The Merton Option-Based Model of Firm Default
We consider a simple structural approach to modeling changes in the credit quality of a firm.  The
basic premise is that the underlying asset value evolves over time (e.g. through a simple diffusion
process), and that default is triggered by a drop in firm’s asset value below the value of its
callable liabilities.  Following Merton (1974), the shareholders effectively hold a put option on
the firm, while the debtholders hold a call option.  If the value of the firm falls below a certain
threshold, the shareholders will put the firm to the debtholders.  The concept is shown
schematically Figure 2.
The Merton model defines default as when the value of an institution’s assets declines to below
the value of its liabilities.  In standard implementations of Merton's approach, asset returns are
taken to be normally distributed.  Credit portfolio management models such as CreditMetrics
adjust the asset returns to be standard normally distributed.  Moreover, this class of models places
a specific interpretation on credit ratings from rating agencies, namely as a distance to default-15-
metric,
23 where the default probability can be expressed as the probability of a standard normal
variable falling below some critical value.  Similarly, thresholds can be established for transitions
to other rating states (see Figure 3).
Employing the empirically estimated probability of default (PD) for a specific initial rating class,












where  Φ (·) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution.
24  In other words, the critical
value matches the probability of an adverse change in asset values with the expected default
probability.  An assets return less than ZD will result in default.
The assumption of normality is carried to higher dimensions.  In the case of two banks, the joint
normal distribution of their assets will characterize their joint likelihood of default.  It should now
be clear how correlation will enter the picture: correlation of losses will derive from correlation of
assets.  Moreover, those default correlations should be much lower than asset correlation.  For
example, if PDA= 0.10% (corresponding to about a A- rating) and PDB = 0.20% (corresponding
about a BBB rating) and their asset correlation is 40%, their implied default correlation would be
about 3.3%.
                                                     
23 See also Saunders and Allen (2002).
24 See the Appendix for a mapping from credit grades to PDs.-16-
3.2.5. Conditional Loss
Building up the loss distribution by simulating states of the world (economy) is done by
integrating the state-conditional losses over all states.
25  Recall that an individual loan will default
when its asset return zi is less than the critical value ZD:
()
1
iD i z ZP D
− ≤= Φ
Following (3-4), asset returns can be decomposed into a set of k orthogonal systematic factors, M















where both the k systematic factors and the idiosyncratic shock are standard normal, and β i,j are
the factor loadings.  Consequently zi ~ N(0,1).  For the case of a single borrower or a
homogeneous portfolio, we can collapse the systematic factors into one, m:
i =+ i zm αδ ε 3-7
We can determine the constants α  and δ  from the asset correlation between two loans in this
portfolio, E[ ] =  ij i j zz ρ α = .  Hence  ij α ρ =
  and  1 ij δ ρ =− .
26
The sensitivity to the common factor exactly reflects the asset correlations.  For a homogeneous
portfolio, ρ ij = ρ .  Following (3-6), we can express the portfolio asset correlation in terms of the
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Conditional on m, we draw a standard normal variate ε i, and check whether or not the institution
defaults.  This is characterized by an indicator function:
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4.  The Loss Distribution Faced By The FDIC
4.1. The Data
As of year-end 2000, the FDIC insured deposits at nearly 10,000 financial institutions nationwide.
The vast majority – over 8500 – of these institutions are commercial banks, whose deposits are
insured through the Bank Insurance Fund, or BIF.  The remainder of the institutions are Savings
and Loans institutions, the deposits of which are presently insured by the Savings Association
Insurance Fund, or SAIF.  For simplicity we estimate the cumulative loss distribution for the BIF
only.
4.1.1. Probabilities Of Default
There are several sources of default frequency information.  At the aggregate level there is the
time series of defaults since the inception of the FDIC over 65 years ago.  This consists of the
number of failures as well as the number of institutions present in each year, resulting in the
default frequency for each year in the sample.  In Section 3.2 we saw that the historical default
rate from 1934 to 2000 was 0.26% per year.
The second source for PD’s is a credit scoring model which generates a credit score or rating as a
function of firm observables, typically using balance sheet or capital market information as
discussed in Chava and Jarrow (2001).
27  For the purpose of our loss distribution estimates we did
not separately generate a credit scoring model.  However, the FDIC does have such a model and
uses it for just this purpose.
                                                     
27 The first such model was Altman’s Z-score model (Altman (1968)).-19-
Third, there are public sources of risk ratings, such as from Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.  Both
of these rating agencies give solvency standards for the rated institutions in the form of a credit
grade, which may then be converted to a probability of default, PD.  We use PDs implied by
credit ratings for 178 institutions at year-end 2000,
28 comprising 75% of all assets and 62% of all
deposits in the BIF member institutions.  For the remaining banks we simply use the average
historical default probability of 0.256% which corresponds roughly to a BBB rating.
4.1.2. Exposure And Severity
The FDIC uses assets for its own estimates of potential exposure for the simple reason that
historical losses have to date been measured in terms of assets, not insured deposits.  Moreover,
the FDIC has not always paid out only the insured deposit amounts.  When compounded with the
rough estimates which are available for insured deposits for each bank insured today, using assets
turns out to be a more reliable measure of exposure.  To be sure, this results in some peculiarities
when deciding which banks are “big.”  For example, State Street is the 16
th largest bank in the
BIF on a pure asset basis with $64.6bn in assets (qualifying as “big”), yet its deposit base is tiny
in relation at $476mm.  How to deal with this in the loss distribution estimation will be discussed
below.
Severity can be treated in two ways: fixed or stochastic.  We provide results using both methods.
Severity parameters were chosen based on FDIC results of its Failed Bank Cost Analysis as
summarized in Bennett (2001), the details of which are discussed in the next section.
James (1991), in a study of losses realized from bank failures using FDIC data from 1985 - 1988,
finds that these losses average 30% of the failed bank’s assets, one-third of that coming from
                                                     
28 See FDIC (2000), Table 6, reproduced in Appendix B.-20-
direct expenses such as administrative and legal costs.  James finds some economies of scale in
these costs but not in the recovery of poor assets, the other two-thirds.  Note that not all bank
failures result in an FDIC payoff to the depositors of the failed bank.  Of the 412 failed banks
analyzed by James, only 96 (about 23%) result in a payoff.
29  The most common resolution of
bank failures is the auctioning of part or all of the bank’s assets, the so-called purchase and
assumption (P&A) transaction.
30  In the 1990s, of 925 failed institutions, only 68 (~7%) resulted
in a payoff.
For random severity, we want to draw a value from a bounded distribution.  We choose a beta
distribution which has the advantage of being bounded and easily parameterizable.  The beta
distribution has two-parameters which together govern shape and dispersion.
31  The parameters
can be expressed in terms of mean and variance.
4.2. Simulation
4.2.1. Asset Returns
Asset returns are hard to observe directly.  However, for publicly traded banks we do have equity
return information as a proxy.
32  For these banks we may estimate their return correlation matrix
and generate synthetic returns to build up the loss distribution.  Unfortunately less than 10% of
the banks in the BIF are publicly traded, although they hold about two-thirds of all insured
deposits.  We thus perform two simulations, each with a different compromise.
                                                     
29 James (1991), Table 1.
30 See http://www.fdic.gov/hsob/.  For a recent discussion of disposing of failed bank assets, see Spiegel
(2001).
31 Strictly speaking there are four parameters including the two endpoints which are typically 0 and 1.  See
Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974).
32 Arguably equity returns are even preferred since they allow for non-constant liabilities within the Merton
framework.-21-
4.2.2. Equity Return Based Approach
Our first approach takes the 30 largest banks and their state bank subsidiaries, all of which are
publicly traded.  These 30 institutions comprise 57% of total bank assets in the BIF and 44% of
the estimated insured deposits) and are listed in Table 1.
Estimates of the loss distribution are obtained through simulation.  We estimate the correlation
matrix from monthly cum dividend returns obtained from Datastream from January 1996 to
December 2000 and use that to generate correlated standard normal returns, check for each
iteration if the bank default threshold has been passed, and if yes, compute a loss given default as
described in Section 4.1.2.  Returns are generated directly without needing to separate them into a
systematic and idiosyncratic component.
33  While we are able to obtain a reasonably good
estimate of the correlation structure between the 30 largest banks, a key driver for the loss
distribution, we cannot do so for the entire portfolio.
4.2.3. Implied Asset Return Based Approach
The second approach includes all 8500+ banks in the BIF in the loss simulation.  If the BIF
portfolio were homogeneous, we know from (3-8) that the average asset correlation will drive the
asset return process.  Knowing PDi, we may then build up the loss distribution through the
generation of synthetic draws from m, the systematic factor, and ε i, bank i’s idiosyncratic shock.
                                                     
33 This is not unlike the regulatory capital requirement for general and specific market risk.  A separate
specific risk charge is assigned only if the (internal risk) model is not sufficiently granular.  This might
occur if, for instance, all equities in a broad portfolio are represented by only one risk factor, say the
S&P500, rather than, in the limit, each firm being its own risk factor in the value-at-risk model.-22-
There are two problems:  1) assuming that the whole portfolio is homogeneous is troublesome,
and 2) we do not have an estimate of the average asset correlation.  The solution to the first
problem is achieved by grouping or bucketing.  If the assumption of homogeneity for the whole
portfolio is unreasonable, it is less so for properly constructed subsets.  This is described in detail
in Section 4.2.4, but the basic idea is to homogenize on size.
Let’s now turn to the second issue, asset correlations.  In Section 4.1.2 we discussed bank mean
losses and loss volatility.  Isolating just the default component, each bank has a default variance
given by the variance of a Bernoulli trial.
var(defaulti) = 
2
def σ  = PDi (1-PDi)
For a homogeneous portfolio, the portfolio variance approaches
34
2 (1 ) def def PD PD σ ρ ≈−
where PD is the portfolio mean default rate and  def ρ  is the default correlation.  We can express
the unobservable default correlation in terms of observable average default rates as well as its










At the aggregate level,  PD = 0.26% and  ˆdef σ  = 0.42%, implying ρ def = 0.69%.  We will make
one further modification to (4-1) for the simulation by incorporating average default estimates
from each (homogeneous) bucket.  For each of the q = 1,…, Q groups
35 we can compute an
average group-level default rate,  q PD , which will yield group-level estimates of default
correlation
                                                     
34 See JP Morgan (1997) and  Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998).










The Merton model yields a one-to-one mapping between default and asset correlations which can
be used to generate group-level asset correlations.
With this asset correlation implied by the homogeneous default correlation structure, we now
have a simple way of generating simulated asset returns that will determine default based on each
institution’s probability of default.  We draw a set of standardized normal pseudo-random variates
from a multivariate normal distribution with the specified Q× Q correlation matrix.  Each of these
draws will determine whether an institution defaults or not, and by construction these defaults
have the appropriate default correlation.
4.2.4. Bank Grouping
We group the institutions according to asset size, where the 20 largest institutions are in their own
‘bucket’ but the remainder of the institutions are categorized by size in five different buckets.
Each bucket receives one PD value and one loss given default (LGD) value which allows for the
asset correlation matrix to be computed at the group level.  The LGD of bucket q equals the
severity for that bucket times the sum of the assets for all institutions in that bucket.  The design
is summarized in Table 2.
We closely follow the bucketing approach used by the FDIC for its own severity estimates which,
in turn, are based on FDIC’s Failed Bank Cost Analysis data covering 1986 – 1998.
36  They found
the mean loss rate to be a decreasing function of bank size in roughly the breakdown described by
                                                     
36 See Bennett (2001).-24-
these buckets.  We reproduce their findings in Appendix C as a reference.  Our grouping differs
slightly in that we increased granularity at the top (large asset) end and lumped the last two of
their buckets together.
37  The motivation is simple: the loss distribution is driven very heavily by
large, lumpy exposures, indicating that modeling effort should be concentrated there at the
expense of the (much) smaller exposures of the small banks.
To be sure, bucket 21 is somewhat special.  It includes a number of banks which, ranked purely
on asset, should be in the top 20.  However, because their deposit base is so small, including them
in the top 20 would have excluded others more relevant from a perspective of exposure to the
FDIC.  These banks are listed in Table 3.
For comparison, the largest bank in the BIF is Bank of America with $584.3bn in assets and
$217.8bn in estimated insured deposits.  The number 20 bank, Mellon, had $42.0bn in assets and
$12.9bn in estimated insured deposits at year-end 2000.
Because of this property of the correlation matrix, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to
drive the simulation of normal variates from the asset correlation matrix, as opposed to the more
standard Cholesky decomposition approach.
38  PCA simply allows us to compute the coefficients
on the market factors mj, and ε i, the idiosyncratic factors, subject to the constraint of intra-group
correlations being less than one.  An illustrative example is given in Appendix A.
                                                     
37 The severity mean and standard deviation for our smallest bucket is just the average of their last two
buckets.
38 Note that if each group were comprised of a single institution, the diagonal of the correlation matrix
would contain all ones, and we could proceed with standard Cholesky decomposition.-25-
4.3. Results
We present simulation results for the two approaches: equity correlation based for the 30 largest
banks and implied asset correlation based for the entire BIF fund of 8571 banks.  In each case we
ran the simulation with either fixed or random severity.  We consider several percentiles implied
by credit ratings all the way out to AAA, a benchmark thought to be useful by Blinder and
Wescott (2001):  “We were also attracted to the idea […] of targeting the DI [deposit insurance]
fund to have the rough equivalent of a Standard & Poor’s AAA rating – that is, having an annual
probability of default of about 0.01 percent.”
39
4.3.1. Equity Correlation Based Loss Distribution For 30 Largest Banks
Results are summarized in Table 4 employing unconditional estimates of correlations using
monthly returns spanning 1996 to 2000.  It provides the capital levels needed to insure the 30
largest banks to four different confidence levels.  The loss distribution is highly right-skewed.
Losses go up dramatically as we move further out into the tails.  For two of the simulation runs,
no losses were observed at all 1% of the time.
Using random as opposed to fixed severity seems to have only a modest influence.  For instance,
taking the most replication intensive results (# of replications = 100,000), we see that the 99.9%
confidence level, corresponding to a 10bp tail region (implying a 0.10% chance of fund
insolvency), would require about $40bn of capital under the fixed severity and $45bn under the
random severity scenario.  The BIF is capitalized at $31bn (year-end 2000), implying a 99.85%
confidence level, analogous to about a BBB+ rating.  The Blinder and Wescott benchmark
                                                     
39 Blinder and Wescott (2001), p. 10.-26-
suggests a funding level in excess of $100bn -- $156bn for the more realistic random severity
case (# of replications = 100,000), five times the current level!
We repeated the exercise using instead a simple conditional model of correlations.  Specifically
we made use of the method popularized by RiskMetrics: exponentially weighted moving average
(EWMA), a special case of an IGARCH model.
40  Very briefly, covariances are assumed to
evolve dynamically according to:
,, ,, 1 , , (1 ) i jt i jt it jt rr σλ σ λ − =+ −
where ri,t is the return for bank i from time t-1 to t, and 0 < λ  < 1 is a decay weight.  For monthly
data the value of λ  used by RiskMetrics is 0.93; we use this value as well.  A simple
interpretation the EWMA model is as an information updating model: new information receives
weight (1-λ ); thus the decay rate of information is λ
t.  We initialize the dynamic process with the
unconditional estimate using 24 months of data prior to January 1996.
We present two sets of results.  The first is the EWMA correlation matrix at the end of our sample
period, namely December 2000.  For the second set we chose that month over the five-year
sample range where the average correlation was the highest.  That turns out to be August 1998,
the month of the Russian bond crisis.  The motivation is a simple stress test: how would the loss
distribution for the 30 largest banks change if the FDIC faced that correlation structure which
existed at a particularly stressful time within the last five years?  For simplicity we present only
the random severity results as the fixed severity results are very similar.  The results are presented
in Table 5.
                                                     
40 See JP Morgan (1995) for details.-27-
The results are not markedly different from the fixed unconditional correlation results except in
the tails.  Especially the August 1998 scenario generates very high capital requirements at the
AAA level – nearly $200bn.  In addition the distribution seems to have become more skewed.
Comparing the unconditional with the EWMA-based correlations (Aug. 1998), skewness
increased from 37.0 to 46.6.
4.3.2. Implied Asset Correlation Based Loss Distribution For All BIF Banks
Results are summarized in Table 6 below.  It provides the capital levels needed to insure the
portfolio of the 8571 banks in the BIF at year-end 2000.  As with the equity based correlations,
we report results for four different confidence levels.  For simplicity we report only the results for
50,000 replications.
Stochastic severity results in significantly higher capital levels in the tails of the loss distribution:
$104 bn vs. $72 bn for fixed severity at the AAA level.  In addition, to illustrate the general shape
of the loss distribution, Figure 4 shows a histogram of the fixed severity case while Figure 5 is a
kernel density plot of only the tail region: just those losses >$20bn, representing the largest 170
losses (out of 50,000 runs).  The asset based results yield a significantly less skewed loss
distribution.  For fixed severity, the skewness is 13.4 in contrast to values around 40 for the
equity correlation based results.
4.4. Discussion
From the perspective of the simulation results, the major difference between the two approaches
can be traced to the underlying correlations.  Most values in the asset correlation matrix, which
forms the basis of the multivariate Gaussian draws for the simulation, have values around 0.25,-28-
whereas for the equity correlation based results we see correlations typically ranging from 0.4 to
0.6.
41
In either case, the results point to an implied capitalization to about the 99.85% confidence level,
corresponding roughly to a BBB+ rating.  As seen in Table 7, the results are quite consistent
across the different approaches.  The $31bn capitalization level occurs over a narrow range of 12
and 17 bp under our different approaches.  This is not wide enough to affect the implied solvency
level rating for the BIF of BBB+.  One has to go out much further into the tail to detect larger
differences.  Table 8 compares the 0.10%, 0.05% and 0.01% tail regions, corresponding to A-,
A+ and AAA ratings respectively.
Of course the fund cannot have a better credit rating than that of any single exposure that could
render the fund insolvent.  Of the five institutions that have an effective exposure (severity ×
exposure)
42 in excess of the fund reserves, the lowest has a rating of A-.  Of the eight institutions
which have total insured deposits in excess of the fund reserves, the lowest rated institution has a
rating of BBB.
The higher correlations of the equity-based approach, and within that approach the higher
correlations from the conditional crisis matrix (Aug. 1998), bear fruit in the far tail by producing
higher losses.  One needs several large institutions failing in the same year (note that each
replications simulates a loss-year) in order to obtain losses at such levels.  Thus even the asset-
based results, despite containing all 8571 BIF banks, are driven in the tails by the largest
institutions.  In short, differences in tail behavior are driven largely by differences in correlations.
                                                     
41 Calem and Rob (1999) use a single factor model to generate a loss distribution with asset correlations
assumed to be 25%.-29-
On a cautionary note, there is reason to believe that the severity estimates from FDIC used here
are (possibly very) conservative.  For one, there has been no observed failure for an institution
with assets exceeding $33bn.
43  At the end of 2000 more than 20 institutions exceeded this level.
Second, it is easier to dispose of assets when the market for distressed assets is not flooded with
such.  In the event that the FDIC has to deal with multiple bank failures at once, actual severity
will likely be higher.  Both Frye (2000) and Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) document
significantly lower recoveries (higher loss severities) during periods of high aggregate default
rates, in Frye’s case nearly doubling.  The stochastic severity approach is an attempt at simulating
this situation.  To explore this speculation, we reran some of the equity-based simulations by
doubling both the mean and standard deviation of severity draws from  S µ  = 8.75% to 17.5% and
S σ  = 6.93% to 13.86%.  The results are summarized in Table 9 for the unconditional and August
1998 conditional covariance matrices.
All of the capital requirements nearly double at each of the three critical points relative to the
standard severity parameter assumptions, though even at the most extreme specification (stressed
severities, crisis correlation matrix, AAA implied rating level) the losses barely exceed $300bn,
about 3% of U.S. GDP.
44
Finally, recognizing that tail behavior is driven by dependence of asset returns across institutions,
there is exciting new research in extreme event clustering and tail dependence which suggests that
                                                                                                                                                             
42 We take a conservative measure of assets ×  (avg. severity + 2 ×  (std. dev. of severity)) to be effective
exposure.
43 That was Continental Illinois, the ninth largest bank at the time.  It would take triple that amount to get
into the largest ten today.
44 While loss estimates due to banking crises are notoriously difficult to arrive at, this 3% of GDP would
place near the bottom of the sample studied by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).-30-
brute force simulation of models formed from the dense part of historical distribution may not be
very informative about tail behavior.  Authors such as Embrechts, McNeil and Straumann (1999)
remind us that correlation does not equal dependence, and falsely assuming otherwise can lead to
underestimation of tail risk.
5.  Policy Discussion: How much? How safe? Who pays?
5.1. Bank-Level Pricing
There is little argument about the merits of risk-based pricing for banks participating in the
deposit insurance fund.  At a minimum, premiums should cover expected losses, much like banks
price their loans to their borrowers.  Expected loss pricing has two key benefits: at the systemic
level, setting the price for each bank equal to its expected loss ensures that the premium inflows
to the fund are ultimately equal to average long-term loss, making the fund self-financing over
time.  Additionally, risk based pricing helps to relieve moral hazard problems: banks that try to
use the availability of insured deposits to increase risk will be penalized through higher
premiums.
Expected loss based pricing at least controls for default level risk; however, very large exposures
are underpriced.  After all, from the FDIC portfolio perspective, it is contributory risk which
really matters as that effects the loss distribution.  Contributory risk, or unexpected loss
contribution (ULC), is a function of expected loss, correlation effects and exposure.  Pricing for
(risk-based) economic capital consumption would require incorporating ULC.  For a bank this
would simply be the expected loss for exposure i plus the unexpected loss contribution times the
hurdle rate h 
45
                                                     
45 For simplicity, we leave out overhead costs.-31-
ii i P EL h ULC =+ ⋅ 5-1
Computing the hurdle rate for a firm is straightforward, but what does it mean for a government
deposit insurance fund?  A lower bound is likely the risk-free rate which we shall use.
46
To empirically estimate ULC is not so straightforward, reason enough to be skeptical of its
practical usefulness for policy.  One approach is to compute the increase in portfolio UL, ULP,
from increasing $ exposure to a given bank.  Alternatively one could leave out that bank entirely
and compute the difference in ULP, before and after, again by simulation.  Generally large banks
will require a substantially higher economic capital charge because they contribute
disproportionately to the volatility of losses in the insurance fund.  This can make a big
difference.
As an illustration, in Table 10 we present results using the leave-one-out method for two banks:
the first, with assets of over $500bn, is representative of one of the 20 largest bank, while the
second, with assets of about $250mm, is typical of a Bucket 25 bank in the asset correlation based
approach (Bucket 25, recall, is defined as banks with assets <$500MM).
47  We present EL and
ULC in percentage terms.  Note that these figures are based on the impact on a loss distribution
computed via simulation, assuming asset-based exposure with stochastic severity.
Two things are striking about these results.  1) EL-based pricing will penalize riskier banks, as
defined by having a higher PD or a lower rating, and smaller banks since they are assigned higher
severities.  2) Moving from EL to ULC-based pricing significantly penalizes very large banks.
Their premiums would increase by nearly 60% while the premium for a small bank would
                                                     
46 Specifically we use a rate of 2.5%.
47 The $ increase in exposure approach yielded very similar results.-32-
scarcely budge.  This is largely reflective of large exposures contributing disproportionately to
overall (FDIC) portfolio risk.
5.2. Risk Sharing Alternatives
A fundamental question in evaluating policy options for reform of the deposit insurance fund is
who should bear the relevant parts of the FDIC’s loss distribution.  The answer helps determine
the approach for setting the solvency standard for the fund; the level of required pricing, both for
the fund overall and for individual banks; the impact of the “big bank” problem; and the need for
dynamic adjustments, including both rebates and re-capitalization.
The FDIC loss distribution can be thought of as being partitioned into two zones: Zone A,
consisting of small losses which are covered by reserves or callable premiums; and Zone B,
consisting of large or “catastrophic” losses, which are covered by loss reinsurance.  The two
zones are separated by the risk sharing point.  The “fund” is deemed responsible for losses to the
left of the risk sharing point, while a reinsurer is deemed responsible for excess losses to the right
of the point (see Figure 6).
48  This structure mirrors the loss distribution of insured banks: losses
are covered by the banks’ shareholders up to the capitalization level, and beyond that, losses are
borne by deposit insurance and uninsured creditors.
As implied by the loss partitioning, the Zone A and Zone B risks need not be held by the same
party.  In principle, there are three groups that can hold either the Zone A or Zone B risks: the
Government; the banks themselves through a mutual insurance system; or the private capital or
                                                     
48 How large should Zone A be?  Conceptually it should be large enough to provide the correct incentives
for the banks which will be discussed in more detail below.  There is a question of how to treat the very
largest banks that could by themselves wipe out Zone A.  The complex issues around too-big-to-fail are
beyond the scope of this paper, however.  For a recent treatment, see, for instance, Freixas (1999).-33-
reinsurance markets.  We examine three viable combinations.  At one extreme is a government
system, in which the government, through the FDIC and the Treasury, is viewed to hold both the
Zone A (small) and Zone B (catastrophe) risks.  At the other extreme is a private system, in which
the banks mutually reinsure small losses and transfer large, catastrophic risk to the private capital
markets.  In between these two cases is a quasi-mutual system, in which banks mutually insure
small losses in Zone A, but the government reinsures catastrophic losses in Zone B.  Each of
these systems is described below, with policy implications for fund adequacy, pricing, and
dynamic adjustments.
5.2.1. Government System
The government system can be viewed as a mandatory insurance contract between the
government and the banks.  Under this system, the government assumes both parts of the risk
distribution: the Zone A losses, which are booked against a reserve fund administered by the
FDIC; and the Zone B losses, which are reinsured by the Treasury.  In return for providing
insurance protection, the government charges each bank an insurance premium discussed in more
detail below.
5.2.1.1.  Fund Adequacy
Since the government ultimately bears both parts of the risk distribution, the division of risk
between the FDIC and the Treasury is somewhat arbitrary.  As long as the government is solvent,
the fund will be solvent, whether or not there is money specifically set aside to cover claims in
the FDIC.  Under this system, Congress may still choose to maintain a funded reserve: Such a
reserve would provide a pool of readily available money to pay off depositors in case of bank
failures.  It would also create incentives for the FDIC to monitor the banking system, as losses-34-
greater than the size of the fund would require the FDIC to go hat-in-hand to the Treasury.  But in
economic terms, the pool from which small and large claims are paid is strictly a government
accounting entry.
Significantly, given that the entire risk distribution is borne by the government, the solvency
standard for the FDIC’s portion of losses is not strictly relevant.  This means that the fund can be
managed (and premiums can be priced) independently of the impact of large bank exposures.
Similarly, the solvency standard in the fund can be allowed to fluctuate with the business cycle,
eliminating the need for dynamic adjustment mechanisms such as rebates and re-capitalization.
5.2.1.2.  Pricing
If the government assumes the risk in both Zones A and B, it follows that the government bears
the full cost of deposit insurance.  The price for deposit insurance should be equal to an actuarial
charge for expected loss plus a charge for the economic capital needed to absorb loss volatility.
An argument can be made, however, that the government does not need to hold any incremental
capital to absorb loss volatility from bank failures.  Provided that the size of the government
balance sheet (or its risk-free borrowing capacity) is sufficiently large relative to bank-related
claims, then the government has a near-infinite ability to diversify bank losses with other
government claims.
49  This means that the economic capital charge to the government is
effectively zero.  Assuming the government prices deposit insurance at cost, the deposit premium
should be set simply at the level of expected loss.
                                                     
49 This point is arguable.  The United States government ultimately has a finite borrowing capacity, at least
at a given cost of funds.  Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the government should be relatively
indifferent to the timing of losses in the fund.-35-
Pricing below the private sector is the defining feature of the government system.  The very size
of the government allows it to “produce” insurance at a lower cost than the market and transfer
these savings to the banks.  This is not a subsidy to the banking system.  Rather it can be viewed
as a form of public good, where the government can provide deposit insurance more efficiently
than private markets.
Unlike current practice, expected loss pricing also implies non-zero marginal pricing for all
banks, as even well-capitalized institutions have expected losses greater than zero.  This would
align price with the cost of coverage and so eliminate the free rider problem manifest in the
existing system.  Of course as expected loss changes, the premium will change as well, and this
change is not a function of the past losses of the system.
Pennacchi (2002) cautions against procyclical effects resulting from conditional (frequently
updated) risk-based pricing schemes.  Our view of expected loss based pricing is more consistent
with a low frequency updating process.  A death spiral effect of a bank being “downgraded” (be it
by rating agencies or bank supervisors’ own assessment) during a recession requiring expensive
recapitalization  and thus possible further downgrading should be controlled via supervisory
prompt corrective action (PCA) provisions.
50  Some support for this view is provided by Calem
and Rob (1999).  They find that bank risk-taking is U-shaped in capital.  Risk based insurance
premiums exhibit no deterrent effects (in risk-taking behavior) on well-capitalized nor on
severely undercapitalized banks.  Hence they question the effectiveness of capital-based deposit
insurance premiums but cast PCA into a favorable light.  Specifically, they stress the value of
PCA for severely undercapitalized banks, akin to the “death spiral” case.
                                                     
50 Mishkin (1997) views PCA as arguably the most important policy step in FDICIA.-36-
5.2.1.3.  Dynamic Effects
In the government system, there is no link between reserves and current pricing.  As long as the
government correctly sets (annual) prices at the level of (annual) expected loss, the system will be
self-funding over the business cycle.  As a result, there is no need for rebates or re-capitalizations.
The deposit insurance premiums paid by banks are similar to auto insurance premiums paid by
individuals – if a driver doesn’t have an accident, the premium is lost forever; if she does, the
claims are paid up to the full amount insured.  Either way, the premiums are unaffected by the
current level of reserves.
5.2.2. Private System
A private sector alternative to a closed governmental system is for losses to be shared between the
banks and the capital and reinsurance markets.  In this system, the banks would mutually insure
the losses in Zone A, but would reinsure or transfer the losses in Zone B to the capital markets.
Here the FDIC could be viewed as a government-sponsored mutual insurance system operated on
behalf of the banks.  It would administer a “small claims” fund for Zone A losses and would
contract with the private markets for stop-loss reinsurance beyond the risk transfer point.
5.2.2.1.  Fund Adequacy
In a private system, the solvency standard would be of genuine importance.  The FDIC, on behalf
of the banks, would need to judge the point at which it would become efficient to reinsure or
distribute losses beyond the banking system.  The efficient risk transfer point would be a function
of the callable reserves within the banking system and the benefits that could be obtained by
distributing risk outside the system.-37-
A practical consequence of a private system is that the banks in Zone A, and the re-insurers
and/or capital markets in Zone B, would bear the impact of large bank losses.  Recall that the
largest insured bank currently has insured deposits in excess of $200bn, relative to funded
reserves (in the bank fund) of roughly $30bn.  This means that, to reach the solvency standard of
the fund’s biggest bank, the system as a whole would need to hold, or have access to, sufficient
capital to absorb losses at a multiple of current funded reserves.
5.2.2.2.  Pricing
Because a private system would need to hold capital to cover large losses, pricing would have to
reflect both a charge for expected loss and a volatility premium for the capital held to absorb loss
volatility.  This would necessarily imply a higher price than in the closed government system.
The split of pricing between the banks and the re-insurers would depend on the risk transfer point.
Total pricing, however, would be unaffected by the division of losses between Zone A and Zone
B.  At an individual bank level, the impact of the economic capital charge would not be spread
evenly among banks (i.e., in proportion to expected loss), but would be borne disproportionately
by large banks.  This is because large banks impose a much greater need to hold incremental
economic capital.  A specific example is given in Section 5.1.  Under such a pricing regime, it
may not be efficient for large bank depositors to seek deposit insurance coverage.  They might
wind up paying 3-4 bp of insurance premium to protect against 1 bp of expected loss.
5.2.2.3.  Dynamic Effects
Since the solvency standard matters in a private system, the fund would have to be insulated from
cyclical fluctuations.  During expansions, the system would tend to accumulate reserves beyond-38-
the target solvency standard.  To the extent that the excess reserves accumulate within the mutual
system in Zone A, then the excess should be rebated to member banks – otherwise, the mutual
system would be overcapitalized.  To the extent that the excess reserves arise from unclaimed
reinsurance coverage in Zone B, then there is no rationale for a rebate.  The “excess” reserves are
profits to the reinsurers resulting from fairly priced premiums.  Conversely, when reserves in the
mutual system fall below the target solvency standard, there will be a converse need to
recapitalize the fund.  In practice, this is problematic, as recapitalizations are likely to be
necessary at the trough of the business cycle.
5.2.2.4.  Other Observations
Although in theory a private system should allow for efficient pricing of deposit insurance and
create positive incentive effects, we are skeptical that in practice private markets would be able to
play a major role in insuring bank deposits.  There are at least two reasons for this: first, the $3.5
trillion of insured deposits
51 is extremely large relative to the size of both the banking industry
and the insurance markets.  By way of comparison, total Tier 1 capital in the banking industry is
$550 bn and the total policyholders’ surplus of U.S. P&C insurers is $420 bn (Best’s Aggregates
and Averages (1999)).  Relative to the available capital resources, the failure of even a single
large bank could impose huge claims.
52
Second, by transferring risk to private markets, FDIC systemic risk would be converted to off-
balance sheet counterparty risk.  Yet no counterparty would have a solvency standard
significantly better than that of the largest and best capitalized banks in the FDIC system, let
                                                     
51 $2.5tn from the BIF and $0.75tn from the SAIF.
52 Relative to catastrophe claims, a large bank loss could impose huge claims as well. The largest
catastrophe loss event, Hurricane Andrew (1992), resulted in approximately $16 BN in losses.  See The
Insurance Information Institute Insurance Fact Book 2000.-39-
alone equal to the government’s.  As a result, it is unclear that depositors would gain significant
value in the protection afforded by a private insurance system.  In the end, the limited risk
absorption capacity of private markets implies an ongoing government responsibility for losses at
the far right tail.
5.2.3. Quasi-Mutual System
The quasi-mutual system entails an explicit division of the loss distribution between the banking
system and the government.  Accordingly, the policy implications lie somewhere between a
closed governmental system and a purely private system.
5.2.3.1.  Fund Adequacy
In the quasi-mutual system, the banks mutually insure the Zone A losses, while the government
reinsures Zone B losses.  As a result, the overall solvency standard of the system is equal to that
of the government.  The risk sharing point between the banks and the government, however,
determines the amount of risk that the banks will bear themselves.  This point influences the level
of funded or callable reserves the banks need to supply, with implications for pricing and
dynamic adjustments.
5.2.3.2.  Pricing
In a quasi-mutual system, pricing is best seen as separated into two components – premiums
charged by the mutual insurance system and premiums charged by the government.  The rationale
for the government premiums is the same in the quasi-mutual system as it is in a closed
government system: the government should charge the banking system expected loss for the
excess loss reinsurance.  The total cost will depend on the risk sharing point.  If the government is-40-
only insuring extreme catastrophe losses, the year-by-year payment from the banking industry to
the government would be very small.
The price of mutually insuring small bank losses is more complex and depends on where the risk
sharing point is between the government and the banks.  If the Zone A losses were insured by the
private market, the price would be based on expected loss plus an economic capital charge for
loss volatility up to the risk sharing point.  To the extent that Zone A is small and covers only
small losses, required pricing will be close to expected loss.  To the extent that Zone A also
covers large losses, the impact of the economic capital charge could become significant.
Even if an economic capital charge is theoretically required in a quasi-mutual system, practical
considerations may argue for adopting expected loss pricing.  Expected loss pricing would
simplify the requirements for calculating risk-based premiums at the individual bank level.  The
alternative would be to estimate the marginal risk contribution of individual banks up to the risk
sharing point – a difficult analytical exercise that will require a number of simplifying
assumptions.  More importantly, the introduction of an economic capital charge would penalize
large banks disproportionately.
53  Here again, it may not be efficient for large bank depositors to
pay the full marginal cost of deposit insurance protection, although the banks are mandated to
purchase such protection on their behalf by the government.  A better solution might be to price
the mutual insurance at expected loss, even if this meant that small banks would, to a certain
extent, be subsidizing large banks.  Given the complexities associated with a positive economic
capital charge, this may be a small price to pay.
                                                     
53 See the pricing example in Section 5.1.-41-
5.2.3.3.  Dynamic Effects
The dynamic effects in the quasi-mutual system would be similar to those in the private system.
The reserves held by the mutual system to protect against Zone A losses will fluctuate over the
business cycle.  As in the private system, this could lead to a build-up of “excess” reserves above
the target solvency standard (or conversely, the need to re-capitalize the fund if reserves dip
below the solvency standard.)  In such a case, rebates (re-capitalizations) would be appropriate
and should be determined separately from current pricing so that marginal pricing always reflects
expected loss.
6.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper we argue that a constructive approach to addressing some of the core questions of
deposit insurance (How much? How safe? Who pays?) can be found in the toolkit of modern risk
measurement and management.  Specifically, the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is
directly related to the riskiness of the individual banks in its portfolio.  This problem can be
broken down into the familiar components of contemporary credit analysis and used to estimate
the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC insured banks.
We find that the BIF reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution of the
8571 banks which make up the BIF, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating.  This finding is
robust across different approaches (asset vs. equity based) and assumptions about severity (fixed
vs. stochastic).  A BBB+ rating is actually quite low – lower, in fact, than most of the large rated
institutions
54 covered by the fund, and just slightly above implied average rating for all banks in
the system.  The implication is that the U.S. government backstop must be quite important in
maintaining the confidence that depositors ascribe to the fund.  A capitalization level required for-42-
a much higher implied rating of AAA is quite a bit larger: multiples of three to ten of the current
reserve levels.
The potential for “catastrophic” losses resulting from a large number of bank failures (or from the
failure of large banks) suggests that the FDIC’s loss distribution should be thought of as
partitioned into two zones: small losses that are covered by reserves (either funded or callable);
and excess losses that are covered by reinsurance.  A key question under this structure is who
should bear the risk of each part of the FDIC’s loss distribution, and how does the partition point
influence pricing?
The FDIC’s portfolio of banks is highly heterogeneous which complicates matters.  Importantly,
there are significant concentrations: the top 1% of institutions by insured deposits account for just
over half of the insured deposits in the United States.  These banks contribute disproportionately
to the risk borne by the FDIC: the tail of the loss distribution is driven by multiple failures of
large banks.  If deposit insurance premiums were based on contributory risk, large banks would
bear a significant burden.  However, under such a pricing regime, it may not be efficient for large
bank depositors to seek deposit insurance coverage.  They might wind up paying 3-4 bp of
insurance premium to protect against 1 bp of expected loss.
We therefore argue that the most practical and lowest cost solution is for the government to own
both parts of the loss distribution.  This can be viewed as a mandatory insurance contract between
the government and the banks.  Pricing should be risk-based and based specifically on expected
losses.  This greatly mitigates banks’ moral hazard, introduced by the very existence of deposit
insurance, and it ensures that the fund is self-financing over time.
                                                                                                                                                             
54 Of the 30 largest banks, only two have a rating lower than A-.-43-
While several important questions remain unanswered, one certainly is the cost to taxpayers for
this insurance provision.  One way to think of this issue it to treat the backstop provided by U.S.
government to the FDIC as CAT (catastrophic) insurance or a CAT bond.  How might this bond
be priced, and how would that price be influenced by the chosen level of solvency of the fun (i.e.
the level of reserves)?  Might  the size of the fund influence the probability of systemic risk?  We
look tackle these questions in subsequent research.-44-
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Figure 3: Asset Return Distribution for BBB+ Borrower with Rating Thresholds-49-
Figure 4: Loss distribution, asset-based, fixed severity
Figure 5: Tail of loss distribution: largest 170 (of 50,000) events
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Loss Distribution for Losses > $20bn
loss in $bn












Bank of America Keybank Bank of New York
Citibank Wachovia State Street
JP Morgan Chase PNC Amsouth
First Union World Savings
56 National City
FleetBoston LaSalle Bank (ABN Amro) Washington Mutual
Wells Fargo BB&T Union Planters
Bank One Southrust Summit Bank
Suntrust Regions Bank Comerica
US Bank (w/ Firstar) Merrill Lynch Fifth Third
HSBC Mellon Bank Huntington Bank
Table 1: 30 Largest Banks







1 - 20 -- 8.75% 6.93% Bank specific
21 (33) ≥  $15bn 8.75% 6.93% 0.13%
22 (66) $5 - $15bn 8.75% 6.93% 0.18%
23 (268) $1 - $5bn 12.79% 8.54% 0.25%
24 (340) $500mm - $1bn 16.46% 10.60% 0.26%
25 (7804) ≤  $500 mm 23.29% 13.38% 0.26%
Table 2: Bank Bucketing Parameters
Bank Assets ($1000s) Estimated Insured
Deposits ($1000s)
Bank of New York 74,266,429 12,134,756




Table 3: Some Bucket 21 Banks
57
                                                     
56 Owned by Golden West Financial.
57 This is not a complete list of Bucket 21 banks, but rather only those banks which would have been in the
top 20 (in assets) but have a very small deposit base.-52-
$ MMs Needed at Confidence Interval
(Implied Credit Rating)
















$13,599 $40,439 $53,526 $116,650
50,000 $163
($3,132)




$14,355 $44,921 $69,320 $156,110
Table 4: Capital Levels Needed to Insure 30 Largest Banks  (Unconditional Correlations)


















$14,354 $43,524 $67,916 $139,070
50,000 $162
($3,992)




$11,999 $39,545 $67,313 $172,270
Table 5: Capital Levels Needed to Insure 30 Largest Banks  (EWMA Correlations)














$21,223 $35,476 $46,722 $72,976
Random 50,000 $1,107
($3,396)
$22,228 $37,089 $60,317 $103,824
















Asset-Based Random 0.14% BBB+










Fixed $49,252 $71,411 $91,871 Unconditional
Correlation
Random $43,982 $68,413 $114,490




(Aug. 1998) Random $34,375 $73,008 $197,060
Fixed $35,476 $46,722 $72,976
Asset-Based Random $37,089 $60,317 $103,824
Table 8: Comparing Far Tail Regions Across Approaches for Nrep = 50,000
$ MMs Needed at Confidence Interval
(Implied Credit Rating) Correlation
Matrix
EL (UL)














Table 9: Severity Stress Test for Largest 30 banks( Nrep = 100,000)-54-
Big Bank Small Bank
PD (implied rating) 0.04% (AA-) 0.26% (BBB)
Severity (mean): µ SEV 8.75% 22.39%
EL = PD ⋅  µ SEV  (in %) 0.0035% 0.0573%
ULC (in %) 0.0056% 0.0596%
% increase from EL to ULC 59.3% 4.1%
Table 10: EL / ULC pricing comparison-55-
Appendix A
Drawing on (3-8), consider the following illustrative example for two market factors, two groups
and three banks.
•   m1, m2, ε 1, ε 2, ε 3 are iid N(0,1)
•   Banks in Group A and Group B have intra-group correlations of ρ A and ρ B,
respectively, and an inter-group correlation of ρ AB
•   ρ ρ ρ AA A =+ 12
•   ρ ρ ρ BB B =+ 12
•   ρρ ρρ ρ AB A B A B =+ 11 22
We can then draw asset returns for two institutions within Group A as follows:
11 12 2 1 2 1







ρρ ρ ρ ε
ρρ ρ ρ ε
=⋅ +⋅ + − − ⋅
=⋅ +⋅ + − − ⋅
It is straightforward to show that the two asset returns have a correlation of ρ A.  We can draw for
an institution in Group B as follows:
11 12 2 1 2 3 1 BB B B Bmm ρρ ρ ρ ε =⋅ +⋅ + − − ⋅






















Bank Assets (1000s) Estimated Insured
Deposits (1000s)
Bank of America 584,284,000 217,795,700
Citibank 382,106,000 26,678,900
Chase Manhattan (w/o JP Morgan) 377,116,000 58,285,900
First Union 231,837,000 89,110,500
FleetBoston 166,281,000 52,469,400
Wells Fargo (w/o Norwest) 115,539,000 50,040,900
Bank One 101,228,538 12,545,509
Suntrust 99,528,008 41,337,046





World Savings (Golden West Finl.) 55,737,371 29,289,836
LaSalle Bank 48,852,837 17,713,282
BB&T 46,991,799 18,585,193
Southrust 45,170,172 18,096,433
Regions Bank 43,528,061 21,231,341
Merrill Lynch 43,171,125 29,235,608
Mellon Bank 41,974,315 12,880,690
Table 11: The 20 Largest Banks
59-57-
Appendix C











< $100mm 967 24% 24.18% 13.78%
$100mm - $500mm 120 23% 22.39% 12.97%
$500mm - $1bn 15 17% 16.46% 10.60%
$1 - $5bn 22 12% 12.79% 8.54%
$5 – $33bn 9 8% 8.75% 6.93%
Table 12: FDIC Severity Buckets
                                                                                                                                                             
58 Using S&P ratings data from 1981 – 1998.  Table 6 in FDIC (2000).
59 Source: www.fdic.gov
60 Sum of all losses for all institutions in the asset size group divided by the sum of all assets for all
institutions in the asset size group.
61 The mean and standard deviation of the loss as a percent of assets for individual institutions within the
asset size group.